

Trading Rights to Digital Content

By

Nicholas Bentley





Trading Rights to Digital Content

- Intellectual Contributions model of the Copyright system
- Analogue / Digital copies
- Rights of access as trading medium
- 'Rights Office' system for trading rights




Intellectual Contributions



Public Sphere




Public Domain



Education




Intellectual Contributions



Contributions model


Intangible



Tangible

Contributions model - digital


Intangible



Tangible

Contributions model

Intangible




Tangible

Contributions and DRM

- Reduces distribution of copies – public sphere
- Potentially limits feedback – quotes
- Other potential limitations:
 - Central control – privacy
 - Lost dynamics of digital
 - Loss of self-regulation

Analogue Contributions

Intangible



Tangible

Contributions Overview

- All contributions are important
- Rights to contributions become commodity
- Maintain the public sphere and self-regulation

Licenses – Rules

- Every item of content uniquely identified
- Dual IDs represent license
- A range of Rights
- Basic system license - Consumer license:
 - No reproduction without IDs
 - Consuming always allowed
 - Own an ID = unlimited copying
 - Don't own an ID = no copying
 - You need additional rights to do anything else

Viabile distribution system?

- Distributed Internet system for recording and trading rights
- Using secure databases and protocols
- Allowing payment contributions
- Is this a viable distribution model?

'Rights Office' System Features

- Every copy regulated - identified
- Mutual confirmation of Rights Office activities
- Users have vested interests - self-regulating
- Tiered system & opaque identifiers provide privacy
- Copies will tend to remain properly identified
- Identified copies have competitive advantage
- P2P networks
- Choice for reproduction equipment

Balance

- Balanced not perfect system
- Remunerated and unremunerated use
- Private property and public sphere
- If correct balance there is no loss to rights holder

Balance and User Incentives

- Business models and user incentives to increase value of rights
- Direct benefits to users
 - No limit on number of copies
 - Permanent right of access
- Moral advantage
- Dynamics of contributions model:
 - Share in success of primary right holder
 - Super-distribution

Trading Rights to Digital Content

By

Nicholas Bentley




Trading Rights - Rights Identifiers

Primary rights holder:

<http://www.commonrights.com/RightsOffice/ARO-128.htm#ARO3>

Secondary rights holder:

<http://www.commonrights.com/RightsOffice/CRO-900-CRO1.htm>



Balance and User Incentives

- Direct benefits to users
 - No limit on copies
 - Permanent right of access
 - Use of P2P networks
 - Derivative or transformative works

Balance and User Incentives

- Moral advantages:
 - Demonstrate right to a work
 - Demonstrate support for artist
 - Demonstrate support for public sphere

Incentives of a Dynamic environment:

- Distribution chain – future updates
- Users can share success of primary right holder:
 - Pricing model – number of items
 - Referral modal - super-distribution
 - Pre-sell works

Content as Replicators

Medium / Coefficient	Fecundity	Fidelity	Longevity	Replicator Value
Vinyl Record	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.14
Cassette tape	0.9	0.7	0.3	0.19
CD	0.45	0.95	0.9	0.38
Music, MP3	0.95	0.9	0.8	0.68
Music + DRM	0.5	0.95	0.9	0.43
Music + Ids	0.7	0.95	0.95	0.63

Replicator success value = Fecundity * Fidelity * Longevity

Rights Office - Obstacles

- Complicated Internet structure of Rights Offices
 - Protocols
 - Security
- Cost of supporting persistent identifiers?
- Standard licenses supported by REL
- Legal enforcement
- User acceptance